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Abstract 
 
This article focusses on an Australian piece of legislation and 
interesting case law, as well as on how the Federal Court of 
Australia has applied Australia's Corporations Act, 2001 to 
characterise a person as a de facto director – that is, as a 
professed director whose appointment as such was defective. In 
this regard, the decisions of that Court will, as envisaged in the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 constitute 
persuasive authority. The Australian decision to be discussed in 
this article is significant in that the South African Companies Act 
71 of 2008 does not contain substantively similar provisions to 
those of Australia's Corporations Act 2001. For example, section 
66(7) of South Africa's Companies Act, 2008 contains the phrase 
"entitled to serve" as a director. This article explains the legal 
implications relevant to that expression, including whether it 
imposes a statutory condition precedent. This article also 
considers the validity of decisions taken by a person who is not 
"entitled to serve" as a director.  
Keywords 
De facto director; De jure director; director liability; board of 
directors; decisions of the board of directors; contractual 
condition; entitled to serve; written authority; estoppel. 
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1 Introduction 
Significant changes to the Companies Act 71 of 2008 were made by 
excluding relevant sections of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. Accordingly, 
before we focus on those sections not incorporated in the 2008 Act, the 
following unreported matter explains the present problem relevant to de 
facto directors. The facts of Octavia Matshidiso Matloa v Multichoice South 
Africa1 were simple and may be summarised as follows. Octavia was 
approached by Multichoice to serve as a director/chair the audit committee. 
On 8 August 2018, after completing ten different interviews, Octavia 
received a written invitation to serve on the board of directors of Multichoice 
and to be officially appointed by the annual general meeting of shareholders 
on 30 August 2018 as required by the memorandum of incorporation of 
Multichoice in terms of section 61(8)(b) of the 2008 Act. At this meeting her 
appointment to proceed as a director was not confirmed by the 
shareholders. Nevertheless, despite not being appointed/approved as a 
director, Octavia attended board meetings and cast votes either to support 
or to reject business decisions for at least nine months. Subsequently, on 9 
April 2019, Octavia received a letter confirming her termination as a director. 
The memorandum of incorporation of Multichoice specifically referred to the 
purposes of the annual general meeting of shareholders, inter alia the 
confirmation of appointed directors. In this regard Octavia appeared to 
external persons of the company as a de jure director; in other words, 
Octavia appeared to be duly appointed. Accordingly, Multichoice 
communicated the termination of her position as director to the Companies 
Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC), which noted the termination as 
one of resignation, as CIPC has no tick-box to note "de facto appointed 
directors". The CIPC record allows only for the recording of "removal as a 
director" and or "resignation as a director". The director continued to attend 
board meetings and to cast votes until 9 April without complying with the 
memorandum of incorporation of Multichoice. Under what circumstances 
                                            
  Neels Kilian. MA (Regensburg) LLM (UP) LLD (UFS). Senior lecturer at the faculty 
of law, North-West University, South Africa. Former research fellow, Deakin 
University (Australia), and the Free State University (South Africa). E-mail: 
corneliuskilian@hotmail.com. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2890-9350. I would like to 
thank Professor Stephen Bottomley (Australian National University) for his 
comments on paragraph 8 of this article. I would also like to thank the PA and Alize 
Malan Memorial Trust for its grants. In brief, PA Malan was the co-founder of 
Naspers Ltd, Santam Ltd and Sanlam Ltd. The opinions and/or views in this article 
are those of the researcher and do not reflect the views and or opinions of the above 
persons. I accept full responsibility for any inaccuracies.  
1  Octavia Matshidiso Matloa v Multichoice South Africa (Gauteng Division) 
(unreported) case number 40731/2019 of 6 February 2020. The CIPC was the third 
respondent in this matter. The author acted as co-counsel for the applicant. 
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would the votes cast be valid? Or would those board meetings be valid in 
terms of the Companies Act, 2008?  
In addition, a dispute arose as to whether the appointment could be 
terminated by Multichoice on 9 April 2019, bearing in mind the fact that the 
appointment was defective.2 To answer these questions, this article refers 
to an Australian case and to how the Federal Court of Australia applied the 
Corporations Act, 2001, where a de facto director acted as if he were a de 
jure director.3 In this regard, the decision of the Federal Court,4 as 
envisaged in the South African Constitution, constitutes persuasive 
authority as regards the acknowledgement of the validity of votes and/or 
board meetings.5 A real concern is the fact that the Companies Act, 2008 
does not contain a section similar to those contained in the Australian 
Corporations Act, 2001, the South African Companies Act 61 of 1973, the 
Companies Act 46 of 1926 or the Companies Act 31 of 1909.6 It seems that 
"entitled to serve" could be understood as a statutory condition to rely on 
the importance of a de jure director only. In this regard, one is left wondering 
what constitutes "entitled to serve"? 
In its original meaning, a person could not act as a de facto director unless 
he or she had been appointed as a de jure director.7 The first part of this 
                                            
2  The High Court granted an order that the appointment had lapsed automatically on 
30 August 2018, implying the existence of a de facto director – from 8 August until 
30 August. The Court was not asked to investigate whether the board decisions or 
votes cast after 30 August were either valid or invalid. The application was initially 
opposed by Multichoice, and later the respondent decided not to oppose the 
application pertaining to the termination letter sent on 9 April 2019. The CIPC 
received an order from the Court to amend its systems to enable it to take note of de 
facto directors (appointments that lapse automatically).  
3  Baxt 2012 ABLR 209; Atkin and Cheilyk 2015 Inhouse Counsel 41. It is possible to 
be both a shadow and a de facto director, although there is a difference in the law. 
In this regard, see Buzzle Operations Pty (Ltd) (In Liq) v Apple Computer Australia 
Pty (Ltd) [2010] NSWSC 233, 236. A shadow director, for example, is an 
executive/shareholder of a company that supersedes the board in business 
decisions and the implementation of business decisions; Blackman 1993 SALJ 473; 
see in general Smith 1978 MLR 147. A shareholder can complain to the company or 
take a derivative action concerning any irregularity in the conduct of the company, 
e.g. the improper appointment of directors; also see in general Tomasic, Bottomley 
and McQueen Corporations Law in Australia 230. Here the authors discuss the 
doctrine of constructive notice in relation to apparent authority. It is also germane 
from a South African perspective, explaining the common law to a certain extent; 
and Francis v Sharp 2004 3 SA 230 (C) 243 for an explanation of a de facto director. 
4  Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Austin (1998) 28 ACSR 56. 
5  See in general s 66(7) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
6  The Companies Act 61 of 1973, for example s 214, and the Corporations Act, 2001, 
s 201M are similar, since both regulate the validity of actions/decisions of directors 
who were appointed defectively.  
7  No authority exists in South Africa; but this argument is considered in the main text. 
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article focusses on "entitled to serve" in relation to decisions taken at board 
meetings. In addition, the first part will also consider transactions concluded 
with third parties on behalf of the company and whether those transactions 
are valid.8 The purpose of this article is not to analyse in depth previous 
South African (or Australian) decisions pertaining to transactions concluded 
with third persons on behalf of the company (and the implications of the so-
called Turquand rule or indoor management rule) or the validity of board 
decisions or votes cast of the company as a result of estoppel.9 This, then, 
provides an opportunity in this article to explore the definition of a director 
as defined in the Australian Corporations Act, 2001 and the previous South 
African Companies Acts to rely on a suitable interpretation of directors and 
to encourage the existence of de facto directors in the 2008 Act.10 On the 
other hand, a real concern is that there is no section in the 2008 Act similar 
to section 214 of the 1973 Act, and the 2008 Act would seem to encourage 
an interpretation, especially those who transact with a de facto director, not 
to recognise those transactions as being valid and/or enforceable.  
2 Brief general background to the appointment of directors 
in South African company law 
The appointment of directors is generally regulated by applicable legislation, 
for example the 2008 Act or the 1973 Act. In this regard we will briefly note 
the process of appointing a director in terms of the Companies Acts of 1973 
and 2008. In the 1973 Act the signatories to the company's constitution were 
members of the first board of directors – that is, they were the founders of 
                                            
8  Dowjee Co Ltd v Waja 1929 TPD 66, 68. This case confirms the appointment of de 
facto directors; Blackman 1993 SALJ 473. Where a director acted without authority, 
the company can claim damages from the director or set the transaction aside; Atkin 
and Cheilyk 2015 Inhouse Counsel 43. 
9  Locke 2002 SA Merc LJ 420; Cassim and Cassim 2017 SALJ 639; Blackman 1993 
SALJ 473; Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E&B327, 119 ER 886; Volkskas 
Beleggings Korporasie Bpk v Oranje Benefit Society 1978 1 SA 45 (A); Delport New 
Entrepreneurial Law 105, 295; Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 181-184; 
Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833; McLennan 1979 SALJ 329; Mulligan 1960 SALJ 
332; Montrose 1934 LQR 224; Nock 1967 MLR 705; Burstein v Yale 1958 1 SA 768 
(W); Baxter 1976 JBL 323; Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
Concerning irregularities in the appointment of directors, only the company should 
in principle complain about these and in principle rectify them; Kerr Law of Agency 
92; Northside Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar General [1990] 170 CLR 146, 160 
Mason J for an explanation of the indoor management rule (Turquand rule) and 
relevant explanation of agency principles; see Story v Advance Bank (1993) 31 
NSWLR 722 relevant to s 128 and 129 of the Corporations Act, 2001 with reference 
to the Turquand rule or indoor management rule; Ramsay, Stapledon and Fong 1999 
JBFLP 38; and Seely Protection Afforded to Third Parties 14, 28. 
10  See Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Austin (1998) 28 ACSR 56. 
N KILIAN  PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  5 
the company.11 The signatories to the constitution could have the power to 
appoint the first board of directors12 and the constitution might in this regard 
provide for a maximum number of directors to be appointed by the 
signatories. In addition, the recommendation of a director or the 
recommendation to appoint a director was also subject to section 210. In 
terms of this section, a unilateral director appointment by, for instance, the 
board of directors was not valid unless the general meeting of shareholders 
had approved the recommendation.13 A director recommendation that was 
not approved by such a meeting rendered the appointment defective.14 In 
this regard, a director who had been nominated to act as such without the 
necessary approval of the general meeting or otherwise was simply referred 
to as a de facto director in terms of the law. This process for appointing 
directors was reasonably simple to understand and uncomplicated to follow 
in practice.15 Although an appointment could be defective in the law, the 
actions of such a director were still valid as if the appointment were one of 
de jure in terms of section 214 of the 1973 Act.16  
In the Companies Act 2008 the process to appoint a de jure director is fairly 
complicated, because the Act makes use of alternative phrases or 
alternative provisions for the appointment of a director. Therefore, the first 
incorporators may serve as the first board of directors unless the 
memorandum of incorporation provides otherwise as an alternative 
provision.17 In addition, section 66(4)(a)(i) states that the first appointment 
of directors may be carried out by a single person who has been nominated 
for this task in the memorandum of incorporation for them to serve as 
directors.18 Besides the latter, it is also possible that directors - to replace 
the incorporators - could also be elected by persons other than a single 
person. It is not clear who the persons are, since this could refer to either 
shareholders (in a general meeting) or incorporators, because both 
categories of persons may cast votes for director appointments. In addition, 
                                            
11  Sections 208(2) and 209 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (the 1973 Act). In 
Australia, signatories are known as initial directors; in other words, persons who 
have consented to act as the first board of directors. 
12  Section 210(2) of the 1973 Act.  
13  See in general ss 210G and 201H of the Corporations Act, 2001 where the general 
meeting of shareholders can appoint a director or where the board of directors can 
appoint an additional director to the board.  
14  Section 210(2) of the 1973 Act.  
15  Francis v Sharp 2004 3 SA 230 (C) 243, where the Court explained the meaning of 
de facto. 
16  See para 3 of this article.  
17  Section 66(2)(b) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the 2008 Act) requires that there 
be three directors for public companies.  
18  Cassim et al, Contemporary Company Law 441-443. 
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the appointment of directors is further explained by section 68(3). In this 
section, the board of directors or shareholders (at a general meeting) may 
also appoint a single person to serve as a director "who satisfies the 
requirements of election" to fill any vacancy on the board as a temporary 
director, unless the memorandum of incorporation provides otherwise. It is 
also not a requirement that such a person must be elected by the annual 
general meeting of shareholders unless the memorandum of incorporation 
requires otherwise.19  
Should a director's appointment be contrary to the provisions of the 2008 
Act, the appointment is defective. In the 2008 Act there is no section similar 
to section 214 of the 1973 Act.20 This lack of a section similar to section 214 
raises the question as to whether a de facto director could still exist in South 
African law. In brief, section 214 states that the decisions of defectively 
appointed directors are valid irrespective of a defect in their appointment; 
for example, where no written permission was obtained from the director to 
act as such in future.21 In the 2008 Act it would appear that section 66(1) 
could also provide for a similar section 214 provision by regulating defective 
appointments and the validity of de facto directors' actions/decisions in the 
memorandum of incorporation.22 If the memorandum is silent in this regard, 
one may argue that the 2008 Act does not make provision for valid decisions 
or actions by directors appointed defectively, and the problem is whether 
such directors could still exist in the law.23 Beside the last point, to entitle 
the person to serve as a de jure director in the 2008 Act the director must 
also confirm his or her appointment in writing and submit the confirmation 
to the company.24 For the reasons stated above, it is possible to pose the 
question: can a de facto director still exist in South African law in the 
                                            
19  Section 68(3) of the 2008 Act.  
20  The 2008 Act, s 66(11) stipulates: "Any failure by a company at any time to have the 
minimum number of directors required by this Act or the company's Memorandum of 
Incorporation, does not limit or negate the authority of the board, or invalidate 
anything done by the board or the company." See Pitt and Tobin 2018 ARITA Journal 
28, 29. 
21  Section 211(1-4) of the 1973 Act. The founder (or other director appointments), and 
the director must present or submit written permission to act as such to the company. 
However, s 214 states that even if no written permission was obtained, the acts of 
the director remain valid.  
22  In the 1973 Act, article 83 of Table A and article 82 of Table B contain provisions 
similar to s 214. 
23  Section 66(6) states that the appointment of a director is void if the appointment 
contravenes the principles of s 69 of the 2008 Act, i.e. the appointment of a 
disqualified director or ineligible director. 
24  Section 66(7) of the 2008 Act.  
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absence of a section similar to section 214 in the 2008 Act?25 Before this 
question is answered, it is important to focus on the following pertinent 
sections of the various Companies Acts to explain the general history 
pertaining to South African directors. 
3 A brief history of relevant legislation in South Africa 
defining directors 
3.1 The Companies Act 31 of 1909 
Section 2 defines a director as follows: "… shall include any person 
occupying the position of director or alternate director of a company, by 
whatever name he may be called."26  
While section 72 is relevant to defective appointments: "The acts of a 
director or manager shall be valid notwithstanding any defect that may 
afterwards be discovered in his appointment or qualification."27 
 
Section 72 is very clear that the decisions taken by a director who has been 
appointed defectively are valid.28 In this regard the 1909 Act clearly states 
that the decisions of such a director remain valid, irrespective of sections 
70(2) and 71(3).29 To a certain extent, section 72 explains the term "occupy" 
in terms of the position of a director in section 2. In other words, whoever 
                                            
25  Section 211(4) of the 1973 Act states clearly that if written permission were not 
obtained by the company, the appointment of the director remains valid. The 2008 
Act has no sections that are similar to ss 211(4) and 214.  
26  Emphasis added. This Act was relevant to the Transvaal, one of the four provinces 
of the Union of South Africa; Collier 2001 C&SLJ 340, 341. 
27  See as an example, Dawson v African Consolidated Land & Trading Co [1898] 1 Ch 
6 (CA). 
28  See in general, British Asbestos Co Ltd v Boyd [1903] 2 Ch 439, 444; Dey v 
Goldfields Building Finance & Trust Corporation Ltd 1927 WLD 180,195-196 
concerning ignorance about a defective appointment.  
29  Section 70(2) of the Companies Act 31 of 1909 (the 1909 Act) states: "On the 
application for registration of the memorandum and articles of a company the 
applicant shall deliver to the Registrar a list of the persons who have consented to 
be directors of the company, and if this list contains the name of any person who has 
not so consented the applicant, and every person who knowingly and wilfully 
authorized or permitted the insertion in the list of the name of a person who has not 
so consented, shall be liable to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds" and s 71(3) states: 
"If after the expiration of the said period or shorter time any unqualified person acts 
as a director of the company, he shall be liable to a fine not exceeding five pounds 
for every day between the expiration of the said period or shorter time and the last 
day on which it is proved that he acted as a director"; see in general Channel 
Collieries Trust Ltd v Dover St Margaret's & Martin Mill Light Railway Co [1914] 2 Ch 
506 (CA) 511-512, in relation to honesty or good faith when appointing directors.  
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the person is who occupies the position of a director, his or her actions are 
valid.30 It is clear that section 2 and section 72 should be considered in order 
to understand the legal consequences of a de facto director.  
3.2 The Companies Act 46 of 1926 
Section 229 regulates the definition of director as follows: "… Includes any 
person occupying the position of director or alternate director of a company, 
by whatever name he may be called."31  
While section 69 states: "The acts of a director or manager shall be valid 
notwithstanding any defect that may afterwards be discovered in his 
appointment or qualification."32 
 
From the above too it is clear that the acts committed by a director who has 
been appointed defectively are valid. To a certain extent the above is similar 
to the provisions of the 1909 Act.33 
                                            
30  We were unable to support our opinion with case law relevant to the 1909 Act.  
31  Emphasis added.  
32  Marrok Plase (Pty) Ltd v Advance Seed Co (Pty) Ltd 1975 3 SA 403(A) 411-413. 
Here the Appeal Court considered s 69 of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 pertaining 
to defective director appointments. The appellant argued that s 69 requires an actual 
appointment and in this case it was argued that no appointment of directors was ever 
made. For this reason s 69 was not applicable. The Appeal Court referred to the 
following statement by Lord Simonds in Morris v Kanssen [1946] AC 459 (HL) 471: 
"There is, as it appears to me, a vital distinction between (a) an appointment in which 
there is a defect or, in other words, a defective appointment, and (b) no appointment 
at all. In the first case, it is implied that some act is done which purports to be an 
appointment but is by reason of some defect inadequate for the purpose; in the 
second case, there is no defect; there is no act at all." Trollip J held that a bona fide 
actual appointment was made, although the correct procedure for the appointment 
was never followed. In this case, blank share transfer forms were signed by the 
nominee directors or first directors of the company and the actual appointment or 
voting for directors at the first shareholders meeting was therefore performed by 
persons who were not actual shareholders. If an incorrect procedure was followed, 
a derivative action could be initiated by a shareholder to ratify or to enforce the 
correct procedure pertaining to director appointments. In this regard, see Smith 1978 
MLR 149; Dowjee Co Ltd v Waja 1929 TPD 66 66, where a quorum consisted of two 
directors. In this case a meeting was conducted by a single majority shareholder, 
and he appointed himself as director of the company. The Court held that there was 
no quorum as required by regulation 60 of Table A of the Companies Act 31 of 1909 
and the appointment was invalid. In regulation 112 of Table A of the 1909 Act, a 
similar provision exists to that of s 72.  
33  See in general, R v Mall 1959 4 SA 607 (N), where the Court considered the validity 
of acts committed by a de facto director. 
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3.3 The Companies Act 61 of 1973 
The 1973 Act defines a director in section 1 as follows: "… Includes any 
person occupying the position of director or alternate director of a company, 
by whatever name he may be designated."34 Whereas section 214 regulates 
the acts committed as a result of a defective appointment: "The acts of a 
director of a company shall be valid notwithstanding any defect that may 
afterwards be discovered in his appointment or qualification."35  
In the above one can observe the similarity of the various sections of 
legislation pertinent to defective appointments. Interestingly, there is no 
similar section 214 in the 2008 Act regarding defective appointments. In this 
Act a director becomes entitled to serve as such if he or she complies with 
section 66(7).36 Section 66(7) of the 2008 Act states as follows:37 
A person becomes entitled to serve as a director of a company when that 
person -  
(a) has been appointed or elected in accordance with this Part, or holds an 
office, title, designation or similar status entitling that person to be an 
ex officio director of the company…; and  
(b) has delivered to the company a written consent to serve as its director. 
In the above it appears that a de facto director cannot exist as such because 
a director is "entitled to serve" only once he or she provides the company 
with written consent, for instance. Is this phrase a condition in South African 
law? In other words, if no consent has been delivered or a person has not 
been elected, the person is not – strictly speaking – entitled to serve as a 
director on behalf of the company. Or is it possible to argue that the actions 
or business decisions of such a person on behalf of the company are still 
valid? In Private Security Regulatory Authority v Commission for 
Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration the Labour Court had to decide 
                                            
34  Emphasis added.  
35  Meskin Henochsberg 407-408. Section 214 of the 1973 Act protects innocent 
persons who act in good faith when dealing with a company and where they believe 
that the directors of the company have been appointed. Article 83 of Table A and 
article 82 of Table B contain provisions similar to s 214. Even if Table A or B has no 
provisions similar to s 214, s 214 remains part of statutory regulation. In the 2008 
Act the memorandum of incorporation could contain a similar provision to s 214. It 
should be noted that s 214 of the 1973 Act required some form of appointment and 
an irregularity occurred in that appointment. If there were no appointment, s 214 
would have had no application to the directors; see Marrok Plase (Pty) Ltd v Advance 
Seed Co (Pty) Ltd 1975 3 SA 403 (A) 412, where this Court considered whether it 
was necessary to rely on s 214 in the event of no director appointments.  
36  See in general, note 25.  
37  Emphasis added.  
N KILIAN  PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  10 
whether a director's appointment could be based on a statutory condition, 
that is, section 14(4)(c) of the Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 
2001, which provides that all persons, including directors, working for a 
security company must undergo a security clearance check.38 Should the 
person or director fail the clearance test or not be subjected to the test, for 
example by not giving the necessary permission or for some other reason, 
the contract of employment will be terminated through the operation of the 
law. The Court stated, perhaps obiter, the following pertaining to a statutory 
condition:39 
I find that a condition [section 14(4)(c)] existed and that the non-fulfilment of 
that condition could have resulted in a termination [of the contract] by 
operation of law … .  
Whether the condition is suspensive or resolutive falls outside the scope of 
this article. It is therefore possible that in future a South African Court could 
be focussing on the written permission or appointment to be entitled to serve 
as a director, and it is possible to argue that should the condition not be met, 
the person will not be entitled to serve as a director of the company. On the 
other hand, it is also possible to focus on section 1 of the 2008 Act, which 
defines a director as follows:40 
… means a member of the board of a company, as contemplated in section 
66, or an alternate director of a company and includes any person occupying 
the position of a director or alternate director, by whatever name designated.  
Besides the above-mentioned section, which will be discussed later in this 
article, there are clearly other examples of conditions in the 2008 Act, for 
example, share qualifications.41 Section 69(7)(c) states that if the minimum 
                                            
38  Private Security Regulatory Authority v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and 
Arbitration 2012 33 ILJ 961 (LC) paras 15, 21, 37.  
39  Private Security Regulatory Authority v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and 
Arbitration 2012 33 ILJ 961 (LC) paras 53, 57, 58. My inclusion. A condition in this 
case could either be resolutive or suspensive. A suspensive condition suspends the 
rights and duties until the condition is met, while a resolutive condition entails a valid 
contract. Should the condition not be met, the contract will be "destroyed" 
retrospectively. The Court held at para 57 that to differentiate between a suspensive 
and a resolutive condition is not relevant to this matter because in any event the 
director cannot have a contract of employment if the statutory condition was not met. 
The Court also held at para 58 that the legal question in labour law concerning an 
unfair dismissal should be based on the unwillingness to reinstate the director rather 
than focussing on a statutory condition to avoid the reinstatement of the director.  
40  Emphasis added. For the meaning of "occupy" see Corporate Affairs Commission v 
Drysdale (1978) 141 CLR 236, 255. The word includes lawful as well as unlawful 
appointments.  
41  Section 69(6)(a) of the 2008 Act; see, in general, Coetzee and Van Tonder 2014 
Obiter 286, 288, 289, 290. The authors discussed the circumstances under which a 
director is subject to a fiduciary duty; Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833. In general, the 
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share qualifications are not met in the memorandum, then that person is 
ineligible to act as a director.42 Generally, a time period is stipulated within 
which a director must obtain the shares. If this qualification/condition has 
not been met, the director is simply an ineligible director and must vacate 
his or her office immediately. Section 66(5)(a) specifies the following: 
… may not serve or continue to serve as an ex officio director of a company, 
despite holding the relevant office, title, designation or similar status, if that 
person is or becomes ineligible or disqualified in terms of section 69.  
What is the legal position in the 2008 Act if the memorandum contains 
neither a clause relevant to defective appointments nor a clause to validate 
the actions of a defective appointment, yet a person acts as a director? Or, 
in other words, the question arises as to whether the decisions of the person 
acting as director are valid or invalid when, for instance, the requirement for 
written consent was not met.  
4 Valid or invalid acts/decisions 
If a director (who was appointed defectively) or company fails to comply with 
the provisions of section 66(7) of the Companies Act 2008, the CIPC may 
issue a compliance notice in the prescribed form to either the company or 
the director, stating that the Commission reasonably believes that section 
66(7) has been contravened.43 A compliance notice may require either the 
company or the director to comply with section 66(7) or to reverse any board 
decision or vote cast vote by the director or to rectify those actions.44 In this 
regard, the director and the decisions or votes cast by such a director could 
be valid when complying with a compliance notice as regulated by section 
171(2).45 Once the requirements of section 66(7) are met, the Commission 
                                            
consequences of the ultra vires doctrine are discussed from a legislative perspective, 
not from a common law perspective. The 1973 Act also regulates share qualification 
in s 211(1)(b). The appointment of a director who is unable to obtain the share 
qualification remains valid due to s 211(4). 
42  Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 30.  
43  Section 171(1) of the 2008 Act; also see Smith 1978 MLR 148, where the author 
discusses the fact that in principle no problems should arise if the shareholder 
prevents an irregularity in advance. The board of directors cannot ratify a future 
breach; it is able to condone only past irregularities. 
44  See in general, Blackman 1993 SALJ 473-476; Markovic 2007 C&SLJ 101. For a 
detailed discussion of what a de facto director is: Lash 2018 
https://legalvision.com.au/what-is-a-de-facto-director/. 
45  A compliance notice may require the person to whom it is addressed to – "(a) cease, 
correct or reverse any action in contravention of this Act; (b) take any action required 
by this Act; (c) restore assets or their value to a company or any other person; (d) 
provide a community service, in the case of a notice issued by the Commission; or 
(e) take any other steps reasonably related to the contravention and designed to 
rectify its effect." Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 751.  
N KILIAN  PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  12 
will issue a compliance certificate. Should the company or director fail to 
comply with the compliance notice, an administrative fine will be applicable 
only if the Commission applies for such an order in a Court of law.46 The 
above requirements may be initiated only by a complainant, i.e. a 
shareholder.47 The Commission may also refer the matter to the Companies 
Tribunal for consideration. On the other hand, the Commission will approach 
the Tribunal only if it considers that non-compliance would be resolved more 
expeditiously.48 Accordingly, provided no complaints were received or no 
investigations were conducted, what will happen to those board decisions 
or votes cast by a director who was appointed defectively?49 
5 No complaints received 
The appointment of a director contrary to section 66(6) constitutes a nullity 
if, at the time of appointment, that person is ineligible or disqualified.50 The 
2008 Act cannot be read to state that a director appointed defectively is 
ineligible to act as such in the event of non-compliance with section 66(7); 
the Act questions when a person is entitled to serve as a director. On the 
other hand, one may also pose the question as to why the legislature did 
not promulgate a provision similar to that of section 214 of the 1973 Act. 
The answer is unclear and for this reason the Companies Bill 2007 may 
provide an answer.51 In the Companies Bill, 2007 a director is defined in 
section 1 as a member of the board of a company, as contemplated in 
section 84 of the Bill.52 A director is disqualified from acting as such if he or 
she has not given his or her consent to act as a director, as regulated in 
section 89(5)(b) of the 2007 Bill. In the Bill consent to act was a statutory 
obligation and should a director have neglected to give his or her consent 
to the company, he or she would be automatically disqualified as a director; 
in other words, he or she would be ineligible. In this regard a section similar 
to section 214 was therefore not required in the 2007 Bill, since a de facto 
                                            
46  Section 175(1) of the 2008 Act.  
47  Section 24(5) of the 2008 Act requires a company to keep director records, e.g. the 
date of appointment of a director, and also to be pertinent to the appointment of 
temporary directors. A temporary director appointed by the board has all the powers, 
functions and duties of any other director of the company. The maintaining of director 
records could be part of s 172 which is relevant to compliance notices.  
48  Section 169(1)(b) of the 2008 Act; see in general Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 and 
843. This deals with the effect of non-compliance relevant to third parties.  
49  Cassim et al, Contemporary Company Law 422. If the minimum number of directors 
is not met, those board decisions remain valid. 
50  Cassim et al, Contemporary Company Law 425. 
51  Section 68(3) of the 2008 Act relevant to temporary directors.  
52  The Companies Bill 2007, available at DTI 2007 http://www.uct.ac.za/usr/ 
companylaw/downloads/legislation/Companies_Bill_2007.pdf. 
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director could not have existed.53 In this regard the actions or decisions or 
votes cast during board meetings by disqualified or ineligible directors are 
invalid.54 In addition it could be argued that the 2008 Act merely inserted the 
phrase "entitled to serve" and that the legislature did not consider it 
important to add a section similar to section 214 of the 1973 Act, since it is 
clear that if no consent were given to the company, the person would not be 
entitled to serve as a director. 55 The effect would therefore be similar to a 
disqualification in the Bill. We therefore have the unique situation of defining 
a director in a manner similar to that in previous legislation without adding a 
section similar to section 214. 
6 Arguments for valid acts 
It is trite law in Australia and South Africa that a director of a company is its 
agent.56 The company, being the principal, needs an agent to conclude 
commercial activities on its behalf, such as signing commercial contracts 
with other parties on behalf of the principal.57 Since the 2008 Act is silent on 
the validity of acts committed by de facto directors, we will briefly refer to 
the South African common law principles pertaining to the validity of acts 
committed by agents with defective authorities.58 The general rule is that a 
person who acts without another's express or implied authority cannot bind 
the principal to any contract or transaction in whose name the agent acts. 
Therefore, the latter is a simple principle of the law of agency.59 However, 
there are two exceptions to this general principle, namely ratification and 
apparent authority.60 Ratification works retrospectively to validate an act 
committed by a person who professed to act as an agent but under the 
                                            
53  On the other hand, a temporary director must also provide acceptance of his or her 
appointment. 
54  Sections 66(5)(b)(i) and 66(7)(a) of the 2008 Act hold that an ex officio director has 
all the powers and functions of any other director of the company; Cassim et al, 
Contemporary Company Law 405. 
55  Sections 66(5)(b)(i) and 66(7)(a) of the 2008 Act; Cassim et al, Contemporary 
Company Law 405. 
56  See in general Northside Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar General [1990] 170 CLR 
146, 160-161; Mason J indicated when the law of agency is not relevant to directors.  
57  Pretorius et al, South African Company Law 464; Blackman 1993 SALJ 478, for a 
detailed discussion of relevant case law authority relevant to valid and invalid acts.  
58  Blackman 1993 SALJ 474. Here the author discusses when a shareholder can 
compel a company to follow the provisions of the constitution.  
59  Kerr Law of Agency 92.  
60  Dowjee Co Ltd v Waja 1929 TPD 80, where the Court discussed the ratification of 
the general meeting of shareholders when a director's appointment was defective; 
Smith 1978 MLR 148 discusses whether ratification is possible under all 
circumstances. The author states that it is very difficult to formulate a test as to when 
an act is ratifiable or non-ratifiable.  
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circumstances was not an agent of the principal.61 The principal could ratify 
the act and dismiss the professed agent from acting as such in future.62 
The problem is whether section 66(7) makes provision for ratification. 
Section 66(7) is clear that a person can act as a director or, in other words, 
is entitled to serve as such when he or she has, for instance, provided 
written consent to the company to act as a director. In addition, whether this 
written consent could be similar to other statutory conditions which also 
require written consent is unclear from a South African perspective; for 
instance the condition in the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981.63 Section 
2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act states the following in respect of valid 
contracts signed by an agent who has written authority to act as such: 64  
No alienation of land … shall … be of any effect unless it is contained in a 
deed of alienation signed by the parties thereto or by their agents acting on 
their written authority. 
From the above it is clear that should an agent purchase land without any 
form of written consent from the principal, the transaction or contract is not 
ratifiable since the agent was not entitled to act as such.65 Written consent 
in this regard could either be sent to the principal for reporting purposes or 
by the principal to the agent for the purposes necessary to authenticate the 
relevant written consent.66 In the South African common law or the law of 
                                            
61  See in general Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 838, where aspects of ratification are 
discussed.  
62  Smith 1978 MLR 151. If the company is unable to ratify the action by majority vote, 
a shareholder may approach a Court for an order to validate the action committed 
by an agent.  
63  In Australia, a similar legal problem was decided by Northside Developments Pty Ltd 
v Registrar General [1990] 170 CLR 146, 166, 204-205, 216, where the NSW Real 
Estate Property Act 25 of 1900 and the liability of the Registrar-General are 
considered when an invalid mortgage is registered in a property transaction. The 
Registrar-General argued the indoor management rule to escape liability.  
64  Kerr Law of Agency 58.  
65  Compare this to Australia in Northside Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar General 
[1990] 170 CLR 146, 166, 190, where law of agency was excluded on the basis of a 
misrepresentation of director authority made by the company; Kerr Law of Agency 
97; see Tomasic, Bottomley and McQueen Corporations Law in Australia 218. Here 
the authors discuss the fact that an agent must be capable of entering into a contract. 
If he is not capable, then the contract cannot be ratified; see, in general Blackman 
1993 SALJ 473-477.  
66  Kerr Law of Agency 61. Concerning the authentication of written consent, Professor 
Kerr relied on various arguments to interpret the concept of written authority. 
Professor Kerr explained that written authority in the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 
1981 should be interpreted to imply "their written" consent. In other words, written 
consent should be authenticated as that of the principal, not the agent per se. On 
the other hand, the agent could send a letter that states "I act as an agent" whereby 
the principal accepts this in writing or the principal might provide a letter that states 
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agency, the law is not clear regarding whether an agent must at all times 
give written consent. There are authorities that state that the agent must at 
all times keep the written consent whenever he concludes a transaction on 
behalf of the principal relevant to the purchasing or selling of land.67 
Although this last scenario falls outside the scope of this article, it illustrates 
the difficulties associated with statutory written consent or authority as a 
requirement to entitle a person to act on behalf of the principal as an agent 
to conclude valid contracts. If no written consent or authority has been 
obtained or no authentication exists, the transactions or contracts for the 
purchase of land entered into on behalf of the principal remain 
unenforceable.68 
In Menelaou v Gerber69 the High Court described in four pages the 
approach of the Courts regarding why written authority was not necessary 
for a person to renegotiate the price of land on behalf of the principal. The 
purchaser signed an offer to purchase and the agent renegotiated the 
selling price. The offer to purchase was amended to include an extra R3000. 
The question the High Court had to decide was whether written authority 
relevant to the renegotiation of the purchase price of land was required by 
section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act. The High Court held that written 
authority is only required to enter into valid contracts on behalf of the 
principal and is not pertinent to price negotiations. In this case, a valid 
contract was originally entered into by the purchaser and seller, and the 
Alienation of Land Act does not make provision for written authority when 
negotiating an increase in the purchase price after signature. In other words, 
there was a valid contract and the increase in purchase price was also 
agreed to by both parties, even if the negotiations occurred via an agent 
without written authority. To require written authority from the principal to 
renegotiate the purchase price is "absurd", as was held by the High Court.70 
However, the 2008 Act regulates the application of the Turquand rule in 
section 20(7) which reads as follows: 
                                            
"You act as an agent", which the agent accepts in writing. The legal technicalities 
relevant to when a letter constitutes either consent or authority should be avoided.  
67  Kerr Law of Agency 66. Professor Kerr refers to an example of written consent and 
refers to Professor De Wet and the Hon Mr Justice Nienaber.  
68  In this regard the parties to a contract of sale of land are the proposed agent and the 
seller. The seller could hold the proposed agent liable as signatory to the contract.  
69  Menelaou v Gerber 1988 3 SA 342 (T). 
70  Menelaou v Gerber 1988 3 SA 342 (T) 346, where the Court held: "To find that an 
agent, verbally authorised thereto, cannot negotiate lawfully on behalf of her principal 
because of the concluding words of the section seems absurd." The Court referred 
to s 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act.  
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A person dealing with a company in good faith, other than a director, 
prescribed officer or shareholder of the company, is entitled to presume that 
the company, in making any decision in the exercise of its powers, has 
complied with all of the formal and procedural requirements in terms of this 
Act, its Memorandum of Incorporation and any rules of the company unless, 
in the circumstances, the person knew or reasonably ought to have known of 
any failure by the company to comply with any such requirement. 
The above section states that a third person can assume, when dealing with 
a director, that this person has complied with all formal and procedural 
requirements in terms of the 2008 Act, including the memorandum of 
incorporation of the company.71 This includes section 66(7). As long as the 
third person did not know or reasonably ought not to have known that a 
director had not complied with section 66(7), then the transactions or 
contracts entered into by the director on behalf of the company are valid, 
making the director de facto. However, this issue becomes complicated 
when a situation occurs where a director does not comply with the rules of 
the memorandum of incorporation or section 66(7); accordingly, the 
shareholders are not allowed to ratify (even by special resolution) the defect 
in his or her authority as regulated in section 20(3).72 Although the latter falls 
outside the scope of this research, Courts will examine those circumstances 
and determine what weight to give them.73 One of the advantages of the 
2008 Act is that a director, shareholder or trade union of the company may 
apply for a Court order to prevent a director from acting as such when the 
requirements of section 66(7) are not fully met.74 These parties will rely on 
the provisions of section 66(1), which will be discussed in the next 
paragraph. The consequences of section 66(1) are relevant to our 
discussion above and will be in conflict with the above discussion.75 
                                            
71  See in general Bell Resources Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Act Revenue 
(1990) 8 ACLC 533, 543, where the Court refused to accept the principles of the 
Turquand rule, where the director/secretary signed company documents and the 
Court held that the "transferee company with the transferor company were such that 
each of those three ought to have known that document had not been duly sealed." 
One may argue that an estate agent, due to his profession, should know the 
requirements of written consent when dealing with a company.  
72  See in general Blackman 1993 SALJ 478.  
73  Section 20(3) of the 2008 Act states: "An action contemplated in subsection (2) may 
not be ratified if it is in contravention of this Act."  
74  Section 20(4) of the 2008 Act; Blackman 1993 SALJ 478. An illegal transaction can 
never be ratified by the company.  
75  Section 20(2) and (7) of the2008 Act. If the authority of a de jure director is limited in 
the memorandum, and the director exceeded those limits, the shareholders can ratify 
the director’s actions by a special resolution.  
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7 Arguments for valid board decisions 
With regard to votes cast or board decisions, it seems that the CIPC leaves 
very little scope for non-compliance with section 66(7). Section 66(1) of the 
2008 Act states that the board of directors manages the business and the 
affairs of the company. The phrase "affairs of a company" straightforwardly 
implies the internal relations of the company; in other words, the day-to-day 
resolutions relevant to the company, such as the daily administrative 
management of the company.76 On the other hand, the "business of the 
company" implies those relationships with third parties or the external 
relations of the company, for example concluding contracts with third 
parties.77 In the previous paragraph we focussed on the latter scenario and 
the relevance of the Turquand rule.78 Section 66(1) continues by stating that 
the board manages the affairs of the company except to the extent that the 
Act or memorandum provides otherwise.79 Section 66(7) states clearly that 
a director is entitled to serve as such when the requirements of that section 
are met.80 In this regard, as long as the provisions of section 66(7) are not 
met the director is not entitled to participate in the affairs of the company. 
In order to understand the 2008 Act it is important to refer to Australia, which 
embodies the current thinking on the appointment of directors. Before doing 
so, it should be noted that where the board knows that a director was 
"appointed", the law of estoppel can also be applied as if the appointment 
were "valid". In this regard, the board or director – depending on the 
circumstances – is estopped from establishing its defectiveness.81 Although 
                                            
76  Cassim et al, Contemporary Company Law 417; there are no definitions in Act 2008 
for affairs and business. However, the definition of business rescue in s 128(1)(b)(i) 
relates to the management of affairs, business and property. In s 142(1), books and 
records relate to the affairs of the company. 
77  Delport New Entrepreneurial Law 66.  
78  Emphasis added; Cassim et al, Contemporary Company Law 423. 
79  See in general Blackman 1993 SALJ 481. Here the author discusses the internal-
management principle of a company.  
80  See in general R v Mall 1959 4 SA 607 (N) 622, where Caney J relied on the 
differences in appointment relevant to s 69 of the 1926 Act. Section 69 is germane 
only if an appointment has been made and not when no appointment has been 
made; also see Inland Revenue Commissioner v Heaver [1949] 2 All ER 367, 369.  
81  Africa's Amalgamated Theatres Ltd v Naylor 1912 WLD 107, 114-116; Flegg v 
McCarthy & Flegg 1942 CPD 109, 114; Dowjee Co Ltd v Waja 1929 TPD 66 80, 86. 
If a de facto director is appointed and the shareholders take no steps to appoint the 
director properly, then for all practical purposes the director is appointed de jure as 
far as third persons are concerned. At 77 the word "quorum" is defined in regulation 
60, but the Court held that an error had occurred in the printing of the Table. The 
Court did not refer specifically to the error and whether the error was eventually 
corrected remains unclear. Regulation 60 states: "No business shall be transacted 
at any general meeting unless a quorum of members is present at the time when the 
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the law of estoppel falls outside the scope of this article, it effectively 
confirms the common law position in this respect.82 However, the 
relationship between estoppel and section 66(1) is unclear, since section 
66(1) requires compliance with the 2008 Act (more specifically section 
66(7)) and could exclude, for example, the common law principles of 
estoppel.83  
8 Australia 
South Africa and Australia have historically a germane United Kingdom 
company law foundation. Ireland is another example. Even the Irish 
Companies Consolidation Act, 1908 in section 285 defines a director as 
"any person occupying the position of a director by whatever name called", 
and section 74 states: "The acts of a director or manager shall be valid 
notwithstanding any defect that may afterwards be discovered in his 
appointment or qualification." 
                                            
meeting proceeds to business; save as herein otherwise provided, a person or 
persons entitled under these regulations to vote and holding not less than one-
sixtieth of the share capital represented at the meeting and personally present at the 
meeting shall be a quorum." According to this regulation, the majority shareholder 
possessed 499 out of 500 shares and, strictly speaking, consisted a quorum; hence, 
a proper appointment as a director was made by the single shareholder who 
appointed himself as managing director. At 78 the Court held that a single person 
cannot constitute a quorum, largely as a result of the printing error in regulation 60, 
which existed at that time. At 80 the Court refused to consider an argument based 
on estoppel; Smith 1978 MLR 147 and 150. Before applying estoppel, a shareholder 
can, for example, use a derivative action to set aside the resolutions taken by 
directors or the board for procedural irregularities. The author argues that the 
resolution may still be valid even if the procedure is irregular. It would be difficult to 
set aside board resolutions based on defective appointments of directors. In this 
regard the author refers to Browne v La Trinidad (1887) 37 Ch D 1.  
82  In Australia and the application of the law of estoppel; see Northside Developments 
Pty Ltd v Registrar General [1990] 170 CLR 146 164-165, where the High Court held 
the importance to strike a fine balance in the law – the interests of the applicant and 
the interests of the respondent – in other words consent to conclude a contract as 
valid based on, for example, the indoor management rule; Hargovan 2017 
Governance Directions 111.  
83  Section 66(1) of the 2008 Act states: "The business and affairs of a company must 
be managed by or under the direction of its board, which has the authority to exercise 
all of the powers and perform any of the functions of the company, except to the 
extent that this Act or the company's Memorandum of Incorporation provides 
otherwise." It should be noted that s 214 of the 1973 Act required some form of 
appointment and in that appointment an irregularity or defect occurred. If there were 
no appointment, s 214 had no application to de facto directors. See in this regard 
Marrok Plase (Pty) Ltd v Advance Seed Co (Pty) Ltd 1975 3 SA 403 (A) 412; also 
see Morris v Kanssen [1946] AC 459 (HL) 471, where s 214 was to an extent similar 
to s 180 of the UK Companies Act, 1948 and where Lord Simmons discussed the 
legal differences in an appointment and no appointment relevant to s 180.  
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In the Australian Corporations Act, 2001 a director is a person who 
exercises influence on the board of directors.84 However, this Act excludes 
professional consultants with influence over the board, such as practising 
solicitors (attorneys) or auditors who give advice to the board.85 Section 
201M states that any act done by a director is valid86 even if the director's 
appointment was defective.87 Section 206B regulates automatically 
disqualified directors. This includes an order of a Court, where a director 
was disqualified in a foreign jurisdiction. However, the automatic 
disqualification of South African directors requires no Court order; in this 
regard, in Australia share qualification does not constitute grounds for 
disqualifying a director who was disqualified in South Africa.88 Section 201D 
enables director consent and should consent not be recorded, this is 
considered an offence. However, it is not an offence committed by the 
director; the company commits the offence.89 Generally, the appointment of 
a temporary director should be validated by the following general meeting 
of shareholders of the company.90 If this meeting does not approve the 
temporary appointment or if it were not approved at the said meeting, then 
that director automatically ceases to act as such after the meeting.91 For a 
proprietary company, this meeting must take place within two months, while 
for a public company it must take place at the next annual general meeting 
of shareholders.92 In the event of an alternate director, this director is 
                                            
84  Section 9(b)(i-ii) of the Corporations Act, 2001 regulates both shadow directors 
((b)(ii)) and de facto directors ((b)(i)). In the Companies Act 61 of 1973, de facto 
directors were not considered directors in terms of s 208, that regulates the minimum 
number of directors, or s 213, where share qualifications were not obtained, or s 215, 
pertaining to an incomplete director register; see Re Canadian Reclaiming & 
Colonizing Co (Coventry & Dixon's Case) (1880) 14 ChD 660; L Suzman (Rand) Ltd 
v Yamoyani (2) 1972 1 SA 109 (W) 113; Re Richborough Furniture Ltd [1996] BCLC 
507; Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd [1988] 2 All ER 692 (CA); Baxt 1976 JBL 211.  
85  Also see s 205B(1) of the Corporations Act, 2001; see Featherstone v Hambleton 
(As Liquidator of Ashala Pty (Ltd) (In Liq) [2015] QCA 43, where a sole director was 
under the influence of a de facto director; Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) 
(2012) 200 FCR 296 concerning a company acting as a consultant to the board. 
86  Also see s 120(1) of the Corporations Act, 2001.  
87  Also see s 205B(1) of the Corporations Act, 2001. 
88  Section 853A and s 206B(6) of the Corporations Act, 2001, which states: "A person 
is disqualified from managing corporations if the person is disqualified, under an 
order made by a Court of a foreign jurisdiction that is in force, from: (a) being a 
director of a foreign company; or (b) being concerned in the management of a foreign 
company; or (c) being a director of a passport fund, or of an operator of a passport 
fund; or (d) being concerned in the management of a passport fund." 
89  Section 201D(3) of the Corporations Act, 2001.  
90  Eg s 201H of the Corporations Act, 2001. 
91  Section 201H(2)-(3) of the Corporations Act, 2001. 
92  Section 201H(2)-(3) of the Corporations Act, 2001. 
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appointed by the approval of the existing board, which can terminate the 
appointment at any time. Section 201K(3) states that the actions or powers 
of an alternate director are "just as effective [valid] as if the powers were 
exercised by a director."93 However, the appointment of an alternate director 
must be in writing (as must any resignation) and the company must keep a 
record of the written appointment or resignation. Apart from this, the 2001 
Act contains no similar statutory condition to that of "entitled to serve". In 
other words, no written consent is personally required from an Australian 
director or alternate director before he or she is "entitled to serve" as such. 
In the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Austin94 the Australian Federal 
Court considered the "entitlement" to act as a director. In this case, a 
director resigned but continued to work for the company by, for example, 
making decisions at board level and concluding transactions with third 
persons on behalf of the company. The question posed to the Court was 
whether this director was entitled to serve without any form of appointment. 
The director argued that he honestly believed he had resigned as company 
director and no longer acted in that capacity.95 The Court focussed on the 
definition of a director in section 60(a) of the Corporations Act 2001, which 
states the following: 
… a person occupying or acting in the position of a director of the body, by 
whatever name called and whether or not validly appointed to occupy, or duly 
authorised to act in, the position. 
The Court held that the director signed cheques and agreements on behalf 
of the company during and after his resignation as if he still were a director 
of that company. He also, for example, negotiated with creditors regarding 
how much debt per month the company could repay.96 The Court did not 
define "acting as director" and a restrictive interpretation of a director was 
adopted. For example, if a director delegated his authority to an employee 
of the company, the employee would not be acting as a director or as a de 
facto director.97 Furthermore, if an employee is acting as an expert and is 
taking important decisions on behalf of the company, he is not acting as a 
                                            
93  My inclusion. This section is known as a replaceable rule; in other words, a 
company's constitution can omit or vary this section. 
94  Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Austin (1998) 28 ACSR 56. 
95  Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Austin (1998) 28 ACSR 56, 8 of electronic copy. 
The electronic copy has no page numbers, but the relevant title of the paragraph is 
"Family tragedies and confusion".  
96  Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Austin (1998) 28 ACSR 56, 7 under the 
paragraph heading "Other activities of Mr Austin".  
97  Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Austin (1998) 28 ACSR 56, 11-12. 
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director or de facto director.98 In this case Mr Austin assisted the company 
in taking financial survival decisions during an emergency period. Although 
the Court held that the law is clear about who constitutes a director in terms 
of section 60, the emergency circumstances affecting the company could 
not be ignored. As a director, Mr Austin assisted the company between 17 
April and 21 June 1996.99 According to the Court, should Mr Austin have 
acted for a shorter period, he would not have acted as a director of the 
company or as a de facto director because the Court held the view that the 
wording of section 60 is very flexible. However, 17 April to 21 June is a long 
period, and under these circumstances he was acting within section 60. As 
a result of the functions Mr Austin performed, it could also not be held that 
he acted merely as an expert or manager or consultant to the company. He 
made key business decisions that were associated with the responsibilities 
of a director.100 The Court thus held the following:101 
The test in the statute is not whether a person has done acts which only a 
director can lawfully do, but whether he or she has occupied or acted in the 
position of a director. Directors commonly do not confine their actions to things 
which only they can lawfully do. Sometimes, indeed, they do quite unlawful 
things while still acting as directors.  
The Court did not focus on section 201M (or section 201D that requires 
consent) which is similar to section 214 of the Companies Act, 1973. The 
Court focussed only on the definition of a director and whether a person 
could occupy the position of a director irrespective of the "things which only" 
directors can do. Should South Africa follow a similar approach, this means 
that the emphasis should be solely on section 1 of the Companies Act 2008; 
the emphasis should not fall on either section 214 of the 1973 Act or on 
section 66(7) of the 2008 Act. Section 1 of the 2008 Act defines a director 
as "any person occupying the position of a director or alternate director". 
Since section 1 uses the same word – "occupy" – it confirms the reasoning 
of the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation case that the term "occupy" is 
germane from a South African perspective. Assuming that the term "occupy" 
has been satisfied, section 1 of the definition of a director in the South 
African Companies Bill 2007 differs from section 1 of the 2008 Act.102 
9 Conclusion 
                                            
98  Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Austin (1998) 28 ACSR 56, 13.  
99  Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Austin (1998) 28 ACSR 56, 9.  
100  Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Austin (1998) 28 ACSR 56, 15.  
101  Emphasis added. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Austin (1998) 28 ACSR 56, 
16. 
102  Cassim et al, Contemporary Company Law 408-410. 
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In the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation case the Court interpreted who can 
act as a director and held that an exception can exist as to when a person 
will not be acting as a de facto director. The only requirement in this regard 
was to act for a shorter period than 17 April to 21 June.103 In the event of 
business decisions after 21 June, it seems that the application of section 
201M (or section 201D) was irrelevant.104 Without referring to section 201M 
in its judgment, the Court confirmed that the definition of a director has little 
meaning; for instance, practising solicitors who influence the decisions of 
the board are not de facto directors.105 From a South African perspective, 
the focus should also be on "occupying" the position of a director and not 
on "entitled to serve" as a director in alignment – to a certain extent – with 
the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation case. 
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